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Abstract
The literature has shown that aid and trade or aid and migration are not independent from
each other: aid can be provided for relaxing migration pressures or donors can tie aid in order to
increase their exports to developing countries. This finding can be generalized to other donors’
policies: investment, technology, environment, security policies and it must be incorporated in
the way aid effectiveness is assessed. The effect of aid can be dampened of enhanced, depending
on whether aid is a substitute or a complement for other policies. In other words, donors should
be consistent to be efficient. Taking advantage of CGD indices, this paper estimates growth
equations by controlling for consistency. We estimate a robust and significant positive effect of
donors’ policy coherence from 22 DAC donors on the economic growth in developing countries.
A one standard deviation increase in consistency changes results in an increase in economic
growth in developing countries of 14%.
Abstract
La littérature économique montre que les politiques d’aide ne sont pas indépendantes des
politiques migratoires ou commerciales: l’aide au développement peut en effet être allouée pour
soulager les pressions migratoires ou pour accroître les exportations des entreprises nationales
vers les pays receveurs à travers "l’aide liée". Ce résultat peut être généralisé à d’autres
politiques: environnementales, technologiques, d’investissement ou de sécurité et doit être pris
en compte dans la façon dont l’efficacité de l’aide est appréhendée. L’effet de l’aide pourrait
en effet s’avérer plus important selon sa substituabilité ou sa complémentarité avec les autres
politiques. En d’autres termes, les donateurs devraient être plus cohérents afin d’être plus
efficients. Tirant profit des indicateurs du CGD, cet article estime des équations de croissance
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tout en contrôlant par la cohérence. Nos résultats mettent en évidence un effet significatif,
positif et robuste de la cohérence des politiques de 22 donateurs du CAD sur la croissance
économique des pays en développement. Une augmentation d’un écart type de la variation de
la cohérence des politiques conduit à une hausse de la croissance économique de 14% dans les
pays en développement.
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1 Introduction
In the literature about aid effectiveness, two strands can be distinguished. The first highlights the
characteristics in the recipient countries, while most recent studies have emphasized the importance
of aid predictability and volatility, which are more under the control of donors. Besides, the analy-
sis of the aid allocation determinants suggests that other motives than fighting for growth in poor
countries can be at the origin of the aid allocation, which in turns explains why growth will not
materialize in the recipient countries. This paper belongs to this second strand; it is more inter-
ested in the donors’ motives behind the decision of providing financial aid. Berthélémy et al. [2009]
demonstrate that aid and migration policies are substitute, which implies that aid can be provided
for relaxing migration pressures and is accompanied in the case of candidate Eastern European
countries by a tightening of migration policies. More generally, this paper questions the consistency
of the whole set of policies from OECD countries towards developing countries, as identified by the
CGD (Center for Global Development). It echoes the debate about the policy coherence of OECD
countries, which has been widely recognized as a core concern to achieve international commitments
and to sustain economic development in developing countries.
In 2010, the United Nations1 pointed out that "the monitoring and evaluation process for policy
coherence also remains a challenge". The OECD also stressed the need to take measures that
ensure the coherence between DAC donors policies and the objective of economic development.
In the report "Effective Aid Management: Twelve Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews"2, one of the
issue addressed by the DAC peer review is "Achieving greater policy coherence for development"
(third lesson). New challenges faced by donors are highlighted: "Set a clear mandate and establish
mechanisms to ensure that policies are assessed for their impact on poor countries". Similarly,
the European Commission has undertaken to elaborate and apply the Policy Coherence for De-
velopment in 12 policy areas3. In 2009, the EU has committed itself to give increased priority to
5 areas: trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration and security. Every 2 years,
EU implementation reports assist member states in adopting policies coherent with development
objectives.4
In conclusion, policy coherence has gained support across the international organizations, especially
to assist poor countries to achieve MDGs. Our coherence index addresses all the policies areas rec-
ognized as core concerns for development and allows us to assess the relevance of PCD (policy
coherence for development) and to measure the effect of such reforms.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a short review of the lit-
erature. Section 3 presents the dataset on which this paper relies, namely the Commitment to
1See Santos-Paulino [2010], UNU WIDER Policy Brief
2See Manning and Hradsky [2008], OECD publication
3European consensus on development, 2005, [Official Journal C 46 of 24.2.2006]. The twelve areas are : trade,
environment, climate change, security, agriculture, fisheries, social policies (employment), migration, research, infor-
mation technologies, transport and energy.
4The last report is Commission [2011].
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Development index (CDI) provided by the Center for Global Development. This CDI describes
the quality of aid provided by each donor to all beneficiaries. To have an indicator of the aid
received, we propose in section 3 a methodology based on the weight of each donor to a recipient.
Section 4 introduces a consistency index for each aid receiving country, which is simply the inverse
of the Herfindahl index calculated with the components of the CDI for the average donor (following
Macedo and Martins [2008]). In section 5 a growth equation is proposed, where the variables of
interest is this consistency index and its dynamics. Section 6 summarizes our main results. Section
7 provides various robustness tests and section 8 concludes.
2 Aid effectiveness
Earlier research on aid effectiveness emphasized the conditions in the recipient country, under which
aid generates economic growth. Amongst those conditions, strong institutions and sound policies
(Burnside and Dollar [2000]) play an important role. Aid should be allocated towards virtuous
countries, which enforce the Washington consensus. This conclusion has given rise to a large and
fruitful literature. According to Hansen and Finn [2001] for instance, aid is effective in promoting
average growth but may face diminishing returns. From a more technical point of view, the ro-
bustness of Burnside and Dollar’s findings turns out to be fragile (Easterly et al. [2004]; Roodman
[2007]; Rajan and Subramanian [2008]).
Searching for the conditions under which aid is efficient requires analyzing also the characteristics
of both the aid, which is provided, and the donors’ action itself. Important studies have addressed
the growth-enhancing effect of aid under its different modalities: short term versus long term or
budget support versus projects. They have also pointed the detrimental effect of aid unpredictabil-
ity (Kodama [2012]5). In the same vein, Chauvet and Guillaumont [2009] argue that aid volatility
is detrimental to growth. Aid flows must be predictable and stable therefore.
A very recent strand of the literature stresses the importance of donors’ coordination, which
should be sought to restrict the negative impact of the aid proliferation on economic growth (Kimura
et al. [2012]). The proliferation of numerous and small projects has been proved to have a signifi-
cant negative effect on aid effectiveness, because proliferation rises administrative costs for recipient
countries (Roodman [2006]; Acharya et al. [2006]). Coordination and specialization, which means
that donors must jointly identify and select the recipient countries, and specialize in different aid
area in order to avoid redundancies and proliferation, should be on the top of the donors’ agenda.
There is no empirical evidence of the complete achievement of these recommendations. Aldasoro
et al. [2010] point out the large gap that remains between the donor commitments and the decisions
that they made. Only few donors select countries and deliver aid to a small number of them, and
few have focused on a limited number of sectors. The recognition of the importance of donors’
5one-fifth to one-third of aid can become ineffective due to unpredictability.
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coordination is reflected in the Accra Declaration on Aid effectiveness (2005) and the Paris Decla-
rations (2003).
Beyond the direct effect of aid, there are many indirect effects or channels, through which aid may
or may not be efficient in promoting growth. According to Gomanee et al. [2005], who distinguish aid
targeted to imports, to government spending and to investment, the main transmission mechanism
is through investment. Cali and Te Velde [2011] examine whether aid for trade has an impact on
trade performance. They describe four types of aid: aid for economic infrastructure, aid for trade
facilitation, aid for productive capacity and aid for trade policy and rules. They report a positive
impact of aid for trade on exports, essentially driven by the improvement of economic infrastructure.
Osei et al. [2004], asking whether donors use tied aid to increase bilateral trade, do not find any
evidence of a positive impact of the former on the latter. However, they report that largest donors
tend to trade more with their aid-recipient countries. Wagner [2003] finds that higher levels of
aid increase exports from donors to recipient countries. Bearce and Tirone [2010] point out that
aid effectiveness is higher when aid is untied to large strategic benefits for donors. In the same
vein, Berthélémy and Tichit [2004] suggest that beyond the objective of promoting growth in poor
countries, aid can be explained by other motives than altruistic motives, which would undermine
aid effectiveness. Berthélémy et al. [2009] have shown that aid and migration are substitute of
complement depending to the initial level of GDP per capita. Similarly, Breunig et al. [2007] argue
that trade and aid are substitutes.
For many authors, conflicts and political instability damage economic growth (Alesina et al.
[1996], amongst others). Jong-A-Pin [2009] report that "instability of the political regime and civil
protest are significantly related to long run economic growth and that a hundred percent increase
of these dimensions is associated with a lower real per capita growth rate of two percent and one
percent, respectively." Besides, political instability and foreign aid are related. The post-conflict
countries double their absorptive capacity during the first post-conflict decade (Collier and Hoeﬄer
[2004])6. Focusing on World Bank projects, Chauvet and Duponchel [2010] estimate that the success
of projects is enhanced by peace duration and by supervision.
Our paper contributes to this very rich literature by questioning the multidimensional feature
of aid. The latter can be understood as the mere official development aid (ODA) from developed
countries towards developing countries. This understanding would fit the simplest definition of aid.
But one can also consider that trade, migration, investment, technology, environment and security
policies in developed countries towards developing countries are also key dimensions of pro-growth
actions, that help poor countries. Abolishing trade barriers will allow trade partners to specialize
where they have comparative advantages and to benefit from higher growth; favoring investment
in poor countries can be expected to promote growth in those countries; developing actions against
insecurity and war will also deliver growth dividends, etc. Aid has many dimensions, which are not
6More particularly, 3 years after the conflict.
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independent from each other. One important contribution from that point of view is Berthélémy
et al. [2009], who have shown that aid and migration are complement or substitute, depending on
the level of GDP per capita in the developing country. This finding has important consequences
for the issue of aid efficiency, while it can be generalized to the other policy dimensions. The fact
that the development of ODA can go in hand with the hardening of migration, trade, investment,
policies, must be incorporated in the way we measure aid effectiveness. The effect of aid can be
dampened of enhanced, depending on whether aid is a substitute or a complement for other policies,
which can go in the opposite direction. In other words, donors should be consistent to be efficient.
To our knowledge, this aspect of the problem has never been investigated, and the originality of the
paper is to fill the gap by highlighting the importance of consistency for explaining aid effectiveness.
3 Policies multidimensionality
This paper argues that the efforts of developed countries towards the promotion of growth in poor
countries must be evaluated against the restrictions that are imposed on the free movement of
goods, capital, and workers, whose effects on growth have been shown to be very influential (for an
excellent summary see Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare [2010]). To investigate the importance of this
multidimensionality on the effectiveness of donor policies, we take advantage of the Commitment
to Development index (CDI) provided by the Center for Global Development. The center notes
twenty-two donors on seven criteria from 2003 to 2010. We rely upon these seven CGD’s indices.
Our dataset comprises data for 81 recipient countries over 2003 to 20107.
The CGD evaluates the provision of aid by OECD countries by incorporating seven components: aid,
trade, investment, technology, security, migration and environment. 22 OECD countries are covered:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom and United States. Each indicator assesses the OECD-country policies according
to their ability to promote development in developing countries and to achieve the international
commitments.
• Paidjt(Aid Index): It describes not only aid flows but also aid quality. Aid quality is assessed
on the aid selectivity, the conditionality (tied aid) and the aid proliferation (a large number
of small projects). Donors are penalized if they send more aid to the most corrupt countries
or to the wealthier nations. CGD also rewards policies of tax benefits and/or of low tax rates
for private charity.
• Ptradejt(Trade Index): It penalizes protectionist policies (using tariffs and subsidies) and
takes into account tacit barriers (by measuring the share of imports from developing countries).
The barriers to imports of goods (that are usually exported by developing countries) or the
7See appendix A for the list of countries
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agricultural policies that encourage overproduction and that contribute to decreasing prices
on international markets are especially considered.
• Pmigrationjt (Migration Index): It penalizes countries that restrict migration. It rates donors
according to educational and working integration of migrants from developing countries. It
also rewards the OECD countries that allow immigrants to send money or return home with
additional abilities. It penalizes countries that discourage unskilled immigrants.
• Pinvestmentjt (Investment Index): It integrates two capital flows: FDI (foreign direct in-
vestment) and portfolio investment. Donors are rated on the promotion of "constructive
investment", that supports economic development. It is based on the existence of domestic
incentives and opportunities to invest in poor countries (such as public pension funds that
encourage investment or such as insurance against political risks common in poor countries).
• Ptechnologyjt (Technology Index): CGD ranks countries according to the domestic incentives
to create and to disseminate new technologies across borders. Governmental support to R&D
(using public funds or tax subsidies) is rewarded. It penalizes governments that sustain
intellectual property rights by patents or copyright rules.
• Psecurityjt(Security Index): It rewards governments that help to maintain peace by financial
or human contributions to UN (or others humanitarian organizations). It also penalizes arms
exports to authoritarian countries.
• Penvironmentjt (Environment Index): It refers to sustainable development and ranks OECD
countries in terms of preserving the environment (especially global resources such as the atmo-
sphere, forests or oceans) or in terms of limitations of the environmental damage. It penalizes
countries using resources disproportionately and it rewards the ratifications of treaties such
as Kyoto Protocol.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the six CGD’s Indices. The indices have been
constructed from the donors’ point of view, with the objective of assessing the quality of their
overall policies. In this paper, we need the quality of the donors’ policies towards each developing
country. Therefore, we compute for each beneficiary country an index, which is the weighted average
of its main donors’ CGD scores. The weights we use are aid, trade, investment or migration shares
as explained below:
PitN =
22∑
j=1
(PjtN ∗ αijt) (1)
7
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Table 1: Description of CGD’s indices
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
aid 193 5.395137 3.535469 .5866705 15.93125
trade 192 5.526042 1.625307 -2.1 8.8
investment 193 4.735844 1.054986 2.167164 6.435821
migration 193 5.186788 2.23862 .9188848 11.83085
environment 193 5.554053 1.496705 .9566727 8.408708
security 193 5.261874 2.12688 1.446391 13.82805
technology 193 5.072587 .9424673 2.570782 7.297703
CGD’s indices are adjusted in order to obtain a 5.0 average in 2008, the reference
year.The following table describes all indices for 22 donors over the 2003-2010
period.
Where j designates the donor, i the recipient country, t the year (t=2003 to 2010), N refers
to the policy component (N = 1, ..., 7): aidjt, tradejt, migrationjt, investmentjt, environmentjt,
technologyjt, securityjt. αijt refers to different weighs according to the type of index:
• aidijt∑22
j=1 aidijt
for N = Aid, Security, Technology and Environment and with aidijt referring to
bilateral aid flows between the donor j and the recipient i. For i=Ukraine, and j=Germany,
Japan, USA-the most important donors- in 2010, the values taken by αUkraine,j,2010 are re-
spectively 23%, 13% and 36%.
• migrantsij2000∑22
j=1migrantsij2000
for N=migration and withmigrantsij2000 referring to the stock of migrants
in each developed country j from each developing country i in 2000. Most Ukrainian migrants
have chosen the USA (αUkraine,USA,2000 = 49%) and Germany (23%) as the country of des-
tination of their migration.
• importsijt∑22
j=1 importsijt
for N=trade and with importsijt referring to the imports of each developed
nation j from each developing country i. The most important trade partners of Ukraine in
2010 are Italy (αUkraine,Italy,2010 = 27% of total trade), Germany (19%), and the USA (10%).
• FDIstocksij2004∑22
j=1 FDIstocksij2004
for N=investment and with FDIstocksij2004 referring to the FDI stocks
in each developing nation i from each developed country j in 2004. Most FDI located in
Ukraine come from the USA (αUkraine,USA,2004 = 82%)
A first approach to have an idea of the consistency of those policies is provided by simple
correlations, which are reported in Table 2. Notice that we focus in what follows on the transformed
P’s indices, to assess the donors policies consistency from the beneficiary’s perspective.
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Table 2: Correlation of P’s indices in levels
Paid Ptrade Pmigration Pinvestiment Psecurity Ptechnology Penvironment
Paid 1.0000
Ptrade -0.0134 1.0000
Pmigration -0.1316 0.0950 1.0000
Pinvestment -0.0837 0.1149 -0.0380 1.0000
Psecurity 0.4631 0.0281 0.0175 -0.0570 1.0000
Ptechnology 0.4385 0.0347 -0.1869 -0.1318 0.3628 1.0000
Penvironment 0.7387 0.0907 -0.2641 -0.0316 0.2263 0.6620 1.0000
Table 3: Correlation of P’s indices in changes
∆Paid ∆Ptrade ∆Pmigration ∆Pinvestment ∆Ptechnology ∆Psecurity ∆Penvironment
∆Paid 1.0000
∆Ptrade -0.0495 1.0000
∆Pmigration 0.0020 0.1218 1.0000
∆Pinvestment -0.0367 -0.1312 -0.0140 1.0000
∆Ptechnology 0.7077 0.0300 -0.0125 -0.0520 1.0000
∆Psecurity 0.6693 0.1032 -0.0490 -0.2095 0.6351 1.0000
∆Penvironment 0.7482 -0.1188 -0.0446 -0.0039 0.8224 0.5652 1.0000
Negative correlations (between P’s indices, in levels but also in changes) reflect a lack of con-
sistency. Policymakers typically assume that trade liberalization and foreign aid ultimately reduce
international migration - that is, that trade and aid are substitutes for migration. If this is true,
when trade liberalization is implemented and enforced by the presence of financial aid, there is no
need for tightening migration policies. As a result, all components of aid can be expected to move
in the same direction. Conversely, in cases of protectionist policies and drying aid flows, migration
policy will tend to fight against the pressures arising from the lack of convergence. Our correlations
support partially those expectations: the correlation between trade and migration policies, in level
(0.0950) and change (0.1218), are positive but the correlation between trade (also migration) and
aid policies, in level is is negative, while the correlation between trade and aid policies, in change,
is negative.
The latter negative correlation can be explained as follows. In its simplest version, the Heckscher-
Ohlin theory tells that trade liberal policies reduce international price differentials between factors,
and this leads to a decline in international migration: this is called convergence. But if we add two
realistic features, migration costs and imperfect capital markets, this substitutability between trade
and migration vanishes. In Schiff and Wang [2008]), a particular attention is paid to the interaction
between financial aid, trade and migration policies. The lower the labor income and the higher
the costs of migration, which cannot be afforded in the real by resorting to capital markets, the
more likely trade liberalization, foreign aid and migration policy, are to “complement” each other.
9
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.46
If, as a result of this complementary, migration and/or trade pressures increase, one can observe
a demand for more protection against free trade and migration. Table 2 and 3 display indeed
negative correlations between trade (as well as migration) and aid policies, in both levels (-0.0134
for trade and -0.1316 for migration) and changes (-0.0495 for trade and 0.0020 for migration). The
negative correlation between migration policies and financial transfers is particularly applicable for
south-north and east-west migration (Berthélémy et al. [2009]).
Actions that improve the security environment in developing countries are unambiguously fa-
vorable to growth. By reducing the probability of conflicts, they act positively on growth. The
channel is direct (improvement of the business climate) or indirect (increase in the attractiveness
for foreign investors and trade partners). By improving the growth perspectives, providing more
security can be analyzed in the same terms as granting financial aid. The correlation with the other
policies components can be expected to be negative if the improvement in the local conditions
make countries more competitive, if it gives the potential migrants the means of moving away, or if,
by pushing the capital away from the donors’ countries, it creates a fear of capital delocalization.
This is a matter of empirics. Table 2 reports positive correlation between the security indicator
and all other indicators in levels, but investment (-0,0570). For what regards changes, the security
index is positively correlated with all other indices changes, but migration (-0,049) and investment
(-0,2095).
An issue that has become a matter of increasing concern in recent years is the link between trade
and the environment. A common argument is that international trade has resulted in greater en-
vironmental degradation in developing countries (see Copeland and Taylor [1994]). In a consistent
world, trade liberalization policies should be accompanied by more supply and demand for environ-
mental protection. López and Schiff [2010] argue that natural resources depletion can be prevented
through capital inflows (foreign aid) and labor outflow (openness by the North). Table 2 shows
that environmental protection is positively associated with trade and aid, but not migration. Table
2 is supported by a recent analysis of the Europe’s commitment to development (Barder et al.),
showing that Europe as a whole performs better than most CDI countries on aid and environment,
but less well in other dimensions such as trade, security and migration.
Facilitating the access to technology in developing countries can be warranted through different
means: openness and liberalization policies, policies which favours the trade of commodities abun-
dant in R&D, although many studies emphasize that simple openness is a more powerful driver of
technological spillovers than exports abundant in R&D. In Schiff and Wang [2008], the analysis of
the functioning of special regional integration frameworks, such as NAFTA, suggests that firms are
significantly more likely to cooperate and transfer knowledge, than without such frameworks. Tech-
nological cooperation goes beyond liberalization policies. It depends upon special circumstances
such as geographical proximity, or the exact content of the trade agreements. Those simple corre-
lations provide a first idea of whether policies are complement or substitute. What we propose in
the following section is a broader definition of consistency, based upon the seven policy components
10
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of the CGD index.
4 Donors’ policy consistency
Instead of focusing on two policies, this section takes a broader view. It investigates whether aid
momentum is concentrated in some policies components (it is non consistent) or more evenly dis-
tributed (it is consistent). The underlying assumption is that a non-consistent and piecemeal aid
strategy, where some donors’ policies are implemented while others remain absent, will yield a neg-
ative outcome. In Macedo and Martins [2008] this negative outcome is explained by the theory of
second best, according to which in a distorted system, reducing one distortion may actually worsen
the outcome. Here the idea is slightly different, and is based upon two assumptions. The first
assumption is that the restrictions that are imposed through capital, trade and migration policies
generate distortions, and that relaxing one distortion can worsen the overall performance if other
restrictions remain in place or if some are reinforced. The second assumption is that ODA and other
policies may not be independent from each other. Migration policies and ODA have been shown
to be substitute in Berthélémy et al. [2009]; in the same vein, financial transfers towards transi-
tion countries were thought as a way of addressing the migration pressures induced by the wage gap.
A simple way to capture complementarity is to measure the concentration of policy components
by means of the Hirschmann-Herfindhal indicator and take the reciprocal of it as an index of policy
complementarity. The methodology is borrowed from Macedo and Martins [2008]8.
Consistencyit =
1∑7
N=1(
PitN
Overall.N )
2
=
1∑7
N=1(
∑22
j=1(PjtN∗αijt)
Overall.N )
2
(2)
Where Consistencyit stands for the complementary index between the N policy components for
country i and in year t; Overall is the simple average, year by year, for country i, over the seven
policy dimensions indicated above. A higher value of Consistencyit denotes a higher complemen-
tarity (and lower concentration).
The model is based on the idea that shifting from a situation where the rankings are at their
minimum levels, while together producing a high level of consistency, towards a situation where all
components are extended up to the point where they reach the maximum score (and complemen-
tarity yields again a maximum), is expected to influence positively growth. A reverse situation of
8For an interesting application to transition countries, see Coricelli and Maurel [2011]
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simultaneous worsening of all policies may also lead to an increase in the consistency index in the-
ory, while it would negatively influence growth. We do not find such cases of increase in consistency
driven by the simultaneous decreases of the rankings towards low levels in our sample.
From this setting, therefore, two predictions can be tested: Increase in consistency, more than
consistency in level, should be positively correlated to growth (1); Policy components and increase
in policy components are not necessarily good for growth, if policies are not improving in consis-
tency (2).
Our model is based therefore upon the following intuition. Let’s distinguish countries with low
(high) level of consistency and low (high) positive change in consistency. Table 4 reports the rate
of growth in such countries, the policies consistency and increase in policies consistency, and the
seven policy scores one by one.
Table 4: Consistency, policy components and economic growth
Bahrain Israel Libya Malaysia Ukraine Belize
Growth rate -3.05 2.62 3.62 3.11 3.90 -.59
Consistency 4.31 3.23 5.85 5.69 6.31 6.02
∆ Consistency -4.92 7.55 8.11 -3.90 9.07 -4.62
Aid 1.26 .55 2.75 1.90 3.26 2.60
Migration 4.71 5.05 4.77 4.61 5.35 4.97
Trade 4.57 5.801 5.51 5.04 5.33 5.48
Investment 5.22 11.16936 8.46 5.17146 5.07 5.06
Technology 1.80 .84 4.49 4.59 4.14 4.16
Security 1.19 .85 3.50 1.82 3.82 3.60
Environment 1.86 .77 4.42 3.41 4.00 3.46
According to the preliminary evidence, economic performance seems to be higher in countries
like Israel, Ukraine or Libya, that benefit from a higher increase in consistency, whatever the initial
level of consistency, be it low (Bahrain) or high (Belize and Malaysia), and whatever the level of
each policy considered separately. Of course, we do not control at this stage for the many other
factors that matter for growth, which is the purpose of the following sections.
5 Model and Econometric methodology
We base our empirical specification on Roodman [2007], applying the usual analysis of economic
growth in developing countries. This paper aims at demonstrating that what really matters is
consistency improvement, whatever the level of each isolated policy. We estimate therefore three
equations: in specification 3a, we replace the usual quantitative ODA term by the P’s policy index.
Each P’s policy index is considered separately, in level and variation, in order to avoid collinearity
issues. In specification 3b, we add the policy coherence index in level and variation. Specifiation 4
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excludes the P’s policy indices but includes the policy coherence in level and variation:
growthit = β0 + λi + β1Xit + β2PitN + β3∆PitN + vit (3a)
growthit = ζ + λi + β1Xit + β2consistencyit + β3PitN + β4∆consistencyit + β5∆PitN + vit (3b)
growthit =β0 + λi + β1Xit + β2consistencyit + β3∆consistencyit + zit (4)
where i designates the recipient countries, j the donor, t the year and N the aid component
varying from 1 to 7 and Xit designates our control variables: initial GDP per capita (log), political
instability, institutional quality, trade openness, inflation and budget surplus.
Economic growth designates the annual growth rate of per capita GDP, expressed in constant US
dollars. The short-term variations are smoothed out using simple moving averages over 4 years. All
variables are expressed in simple moving averages over 4 years. Initial GDP per capita is measured
by the first year of each period considered (for an analogous method see for example Lessmann and
Markwardt [2012]. Trade openness refers to the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
(as a share of GDP). Inflation is proxied by the annual percentage change in consumer prices.
Budget Surplus (as a share of GDP) revenue minus expense over GDP, refers to the soundness
of government fiscal policies. Institutional quality represents the simple average of 5 institutional
variables provided by the World Bank (World governance indicators): control of corruption, voice
and accountability, rule of law, regulatory quality and government effectiveness. Higher values of
our variable indicate better governance ratings. We also integrate political instability, using the
sixth world governance indicator from the World Bank. This variable is rescaled such that higher
values indicate greater instability (for a detailed description of all explanatory variables used in
this article and their sources, see Appendix C). We provide descriptive statistics of the explanatory
variables, by region, in Appendix B.
Results are provided in the subsequent sections 6 and 7. In section 6, table 5 provides OLS
estimates including fixed effects. Section 7 reports IV estimates, for taking into account the endo-
geneity of CGD’s policy components and the index of policy coherence. Our instruments are those
commonly used in the literature (common language and geographical distance between the donor
and the recipient) to which we have added donor’s characteristics (tax rate, inflation, debt, agricul-
ture’s share and budget surplus). Economic health of donors is expected to have a direct impact
on aid efforts, but not on growth in beneficiary countries. All IV estimates include country-fixed
effects.
13
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6 Main Results
From the estimates of equation 3a versus equations 3b and 4, we can conclude that only change in
the policy coherence has a significant, positive, and robust impact on economic growth, but neither
consistency level, nor policies themselves. As suggested by table 4 and according to our model’s
predictions, we can interpret the negative correlations between some policies level (or change) like
aid, migration, and investment policies, and growth (but not trade, interestingly) : those policies do
not have a positive impact on growth in recipient countries if they are not implemented in a coherent
way. In terms of policy recommendation, improvement in consistency and reforms complementarity,
must be the priority. Donors must be aware of the likely adverse impact of one isolated policy’s
improvement on growth, if other policies are not considered simultaneously, to achieve an overall
consistent strategy.
As argued in Macedo and Martins [2008]9, consistency level is not necessarily linked to better
economic performance, as high consistency can go in hand with low levels P’s indices.
We find evidence that the quality of migration policy positively affects economic growth in de-
veloping countries, which echoes the flourishing literature about the positive externalities generated
by migrants abroad (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport [2011]). By contrast, policies to-
wards developing countries in the area of environment, technology, and security are not associated
with better economic performance.
We compute the increase in growth induced by a one standard deviation increase in consistency
change. This calculus is based upon the estimates of equation 4 (column 1, Table 5) which fits our
preferred specification. The standard deviation of the consistency change being equal to 3.68, we
obtained an increase in growth of 13.5% (0.135 percentage point) for an average growth of 3.43:
13.5 = (3.68×0.126)3.43 where 0.126 is the estimate of consistency change. The coefficient is stable,
varying in a range between 0.052 and 0.126.
We also compute the growth increase in Bahrain would the change in donors policies consistency
in this country be of the same order of magnitude than in Israel. We obtain a predicted growth rate
of -0.1 to be compared with the effective growth rate of -3.05. For Malaysia (when compared with
Libya), the predicted rate yields 6.27, it exceeds the effective growth rate by 3.16 percentage points.
All other variables have the expected signs. Well-governed democratic nations grow faster
(Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya [2006]). Resources in open economies are more efficiently allocated.
Growth is higher in countries that are relatively more open to international trade (as in Burn-
9Macedo and Martins [2008] have explained economic growth in transition countries by using 3 types of factors:
initial conditions, macroeconomic stabilization and reforms. They found that reforms (in level) and reforms comple-
mentarity (in variation) generate economic growth, while reforms variation and reforms complementarity (in level)
have a negative impact on economic growth. They explain that reforms (in level) provide long-run objectives and
that reforms complementarity (in variation) describe guidance for the implementation of reforms.
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side and Dollar [2000], Clemens et al. [2004], Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya [2005] or Neanidis and
Varvarigos [2009]). High levels of inflation and political instability within a country have been
found to negatively affect economic growth. The adverse effects of inflation are identified but fre-
quently insignificant in most of our estimates. Furthermore, political instability is not found to
affect economic growth in our sample. An improvement of fiscal revenues, a stringent control of
public expenditures or a return to budgetary balance encourage economic growth (Butkiewicz and
Yanikkaya [2005] or Minoiu and Reddy [2010] among others). As is standard in the literature, ini-
tial income allows us to capture convergence effects. The measure we use (initial GDP per capita)
displays a negative impact, which is coherent with previous literature (e. g. Dalgaard et al. [2004],
Rajan and Subramanian [2008]).
We do not find evidence of an effect of each isolated donors’ policy on economic growth. For
this reason, in the following section, we only rely on equations (3b) and (4).
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Table 5: Effect of donors’ policy on economic growth in developing countries, OLS Fixed Effects
VARIABLES Effect on economic growth of:
Aid policy Migration policy Investment policy Trade policy Security policy Technology policy Environment policy Consistency
(only)
Equation (3a) (3b) (3a) (3b) (3a) (3b) (3a) (3b) (3a) (3b) (3a) (3b) (3a) (3b) (4)
Initial GDP per cap (log) -14.55*** -14.65*** -14.84*** -14.83*** -15.50*** -15.60*** -16.86*** -16.39*** -14.97*** -14.67*** -14.89*** -14.63*** -14.97*** -15.84*** -14.88***
(1.133) (1.104) (1.098) (1.094) (1.371) (1.351) (1.438) (1.431) (1.115) (1.119) (1.077) (1.102) (1.410) (1.581) (1.066)
Recipient pol. instability -0.528 -0.564 -0.939 -0.827 -0.726 -0.686 -0.726 -0.628 -0.496 -0.593 -0.561 -0.518 -0.470 -0.614 -0.616
(0.753) (0.734) (0.764) (0.758) (0.735) (0.728) (0.734) (0.731) (0.742) (0.744) (0.734) (0.741) (0.734) (0.741) (0.733)
Recipient inst. quality 5.331*** 4.972*** 5.305*** 5.468*** 4.730*** 4.833*** 5.298*** 5.401*** 4.816*** 5.315*** 5.325*** 5.075*** 5.429*** 5.140*** 5.340***
(1.543) (1.506) (1.517) (1.499) (1.533) (1.510) (1.508) (1.490) (1.558) (1.559) (1.523) (1.540) (1.519) (1.526) (1.499)
Recipient Trade/GDP 0.026 0.031** 0.022 0.025 0.017 0.021 0.023 0.026* 0.028* 0.031* 0.025* 0.031* 0.029* 0.031** 0.025
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Recipient inflation -0.044 -0.052 -0.059 -0.057 -0.046 -0.044 -0.035 -0.033 -0.053 -0.046 -0.049 -0.053 -0.044 -0.053 -0.040
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Recipient budget surplus 0.246*** 0.204** 0.213*** 0.209*** 0.235*** 0.230*** 0.268*** 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.221*** 0.228*** 0.222*** 0.231*** 0.220*** 0.228***
(0.083) (0.082) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.075)
Consistency -0.763 -0.095 -0.057 0.054 -0.237 0.663 -0.359 -0.0900
(0.876) (0.665) (0.668) (0.661) (0.820) (1.018) (0.783) (0.663)
∆Consistency 0.126*** 0.052*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.088** 0.066 0.076 0.055***
(0.034) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.038) (0.072) (0.052) (0.020)
Paid -0.040 0.499
(0.284) (0.384)
∆Paid 0.011 -0.023*
(0.008) (0.0122)
Pmigration 1.025 0.818
(0.693) (0.692)
∆Pmigration -0.168** -0.156**
(0.077) (0.076)
Ptrade -0.362 -0.313
(0.300) (0.300)
∆Ptrade 0.076** 0.076**
(0.033) (0.032)
Pinvestment 0.443 0.237
(0.543) (0.543)
∆Pinvestment -0.158** -0.151**
(0.067) (0.066)
Psecurity -0.191 0.200
(0.245) (0.338)
∆Psecurity 0.018** -0.007
(0.008) (0.014)
Ptechnology -0.255 -0.546
(0.443) (0.673)
∆Ptechnology 0.034*** 0.006
(0.011) (0.036)
Penvironment 0.263 0.365
(0.299) (0.348)
∆Penvironment 0.023*** -0.004
(0.008) (0.019)
Observations 290 290 299 299 299 299 299 299 290 290 290 290 290 290 299
R-squared 0.633 0.656 0.641 0.653 0.642 0.656 0.643 0.655 0.639 0.649 0.647 0.649 0.645 0.650 0.646
Number of countries 81 81 83 83 83 83 83 83 81 81 81 81 81 81 83
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term is included but not reported.
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7 Robustness checks
While P’s indices and consistency cause higher growth, the reverse causality cannot be excluded
although limited by the use of indices that are not bilateral10. For instance, the poor economic
performance in a developing country raises the demand for both more policies and for more consis-
tency in donors’ policies. To address this endogeneity issue, we select a set of instruments, which
are inspired by the recent literature on aid allocation.
This literature identifies two main categories of instruments for our growth equation: donors
self interest and donors’ economic soundness.11
• Donors’ self interest has been emphasized in several papers. They include geopolitical and
commercial interests12. For what regards commercial interests, exports to the recipient coun-
tries has not been included as this measure is clearly endogenous. Turning to geopolitical
interests, the literature suggests several instruments: historical ties, geographic and cultural
proximity from one hand and geostrategic alliances from the other hand:
– First, historical ties (mainly common colonial past) between recipient countries and
donors are now recognized as an important determinant of aid allocation. Former colonial
links is our first instrument.13
– Second, geographic distance and cultural proximity (common language) can also deter-
mine aid allocation (Tavares [2003]; Chauvet and Guillaumont [2009]). Dreher et al.
[2011] also estimate that developing countries tend to receive more aid from both old
and new donor groups when they are geographically closer. We include a dummy equal
to one if the donor and the recipient share a common language. We include as well
the geographic distance between the capital cities of the donor and recipient countries.
Those variables constitute our second set of instruments.
– Third, geostrategic alliances are likely to induce more aid from political allies or in-
ternational institutions (Alesina and Dollar [2000], Dreher et al. [2009], Kilby [2009]).
Hoeﬄer and Outram [2011] include UN voting allegiance and conclude that recipient
countries voting in line with the United States and the United Kingdom tend to receive
more aid than other developing countries. They also indicate that "it is unclear whether
aid rewards voting allegiance or vice versa, leading some to question its validity as an
10Our strategy is to determine the overall quality of donors’ policies toward each developing country. For that
purpose, we have identified a "weighted" donor for each developing country (see Section 3). Our variables are
therefore more multilateral than bilateral, which allows us to restrict the potential endogeneity bias.
11Two of the three major motives underlying aid (recipients needs and merits) can not be used in aid effectiveness
literature since they are not exogenous instruments.
12Berthélémy [2006] provides an interesting overview of previous findings in aid allocation literature. He concludes
that commercial interests play a major role in explaining aid allocation. He also estimates that trade interests are
more important than geopolitical alliances regarding the quantitative impact of both variables.
13One must be aware that those instruments are questionable: colonial legacy may have a direct effect on economic
growth by explaining the initial levels of technological advances (Price [2003]) or by determining investment, education
of the degree of ethnic fractionalization (Bertocchi and Canova [2002])
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explanatory variable (Berthélémy [2006])". The UN voting allegiance constitutes our
third instrument.
Given the multilateral nature of endogenous variables, we follow the same procedure described
in section 3 to transform the instruments according to the following formula:
AˆNit =
∑22
j=1 αijtXijt
where AˆNit designates our endogenous variables, αijt is the share of aid received by a devel-
oping country from each donor country included in our sample, Xijt is the set of exogenous
instruments we use:
Xijt =

1if i and j share a common language and 0 otherwise
geographic distance between the capital cities of i and j
1if country i votes in line with major donor j
1if country i was a former colony of France, UK, Portugal, Spain or Belgium
• We consider also donors’ economic soundness. Faced with debt concerns, fiscal unbalances
or budget deficits, donors may consider aid as a sacrifice and they may react by tightening
public expenditure, starting with aid flows14. Our strategy is inspired by De Ree and Nillesen
[2009], who consider the effect of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict. In their study, they
employ GDP levels of donors as an instrument for aid. We replace GDP levels by variables,
which describe the donors economic bad or good shape, and which are listed below.
This strategy is based upon the assumption that donors’ economic health has no direct link
with economic growth in recipient countries, which can be debated: 1/ donors in bad shape
are also the main economic partners of beneficiary countries ; 2/ "aid fatigue" may be due to
the unwillingness of giving counterproductive aid, if the government considers that aid is not
effective enough, e. g. in promoting economic growth or development.
As previously, we have to weight the instruments according to the following formula:
AˆNit =
∑22
j=1 αijtXijt
where Xjt designates the donor tax burden (measured by the level of the tax rate), the
donor debt burden, inflationary pressures in donor countries, the share of agriculture in donor
economy, the budget surplus in the donor.
14“Aid fatigue” may also be due to the unwillingness of giving counterproductive aid (if the government considers
that aid is not effective enough, e. g. in promoting economic growth or development) as reported by Tingley [2010].
The main result consists in saying that the ideological orientations of donors (measured by governments priorities and
by influences of political parties, i.e. liberal vs conservative orientations) may explain aid behaviors. Conservative
parties are more likely to give less aid, especially in poorest countries. He also integrates economic determinants of
aid flows (the trade position and economic health of donors). Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller [2004] also find that aid
fatigue is a major determinant of aid allocation.
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The total number of instruments has to be reasonable, and we have to choose amongst several
possible combinations. We have retained the sets of instruments that report the highest values
statistical tests (Sargan and underidentification tests) and we present in table 7 the estimates of
the variable of interest (changes in consistency scores), for parsimony reason 15. They are based on
the following combination of instruments:
• Seven variables including two donors’ self interest (geographic and cultural proximity) and
five variables for donors’ economic soundness.16 Table 6 reports the whole results only for
this instrumentation strategy (others being available upon request).
• Twelve variables for colonial ties and UN voting allegiance. Colonial ties are measured through
a dummy set equal to one if the country was colonized by one of the following five largest
European colonizers (France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and United Kingdom). For UN voting
allegiance, we make use of voting coincidence between recipient countries and 7 major donors
(United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Germany, Canada). The last com-
bination is the addition of the first two: donors’ self interests (colonial legacy, geostrategic
alliances, geographic and cultural proximity) augmented with donor’s economic soundness,
which makes a total of 19 instruments.
Our IV results confirm the positive impact of changes in policy coherence on economic growth.
In table 6, positive changes in consistency scores lead to higher economic growth rates in recipi-
ent countries, while other aid policy coefficients, be the corresponding variable in level or change,
loose their significance. All control variables have the expected signs, as in the previous section.
Our results are robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects.17 We also correct standard errors
for recipient-clustered observations and the results still hold (see Table 13, Appendix F). Table 7
provides a summary of the different instrumentation strategies. It confirms that positive changes
in donors’ policy coherence lead to higher growth in beneficiary countries.
15The results are available upon request.
16We do not include the seven variables in all estimates as we seek to minimize the number of instrumental
variables.
17The first stage regressions are available in Appendix D. We also provide IV results using country and time fixed
effects in order to control for some potential time trend. The results are available in Appendix E. Our results remain
robust.
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Table 6: Effect of donors’ policy on economic growth in recipient countries
IV, Moving averages, 4 years, Country Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Effect on economic growth
Aid policy Migration
policy
Investment
policy
Trade policy Security pol-
icy
Technology
policy
Environment
policy
Consistency
(only)
Equation (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (4)
Initial GDP per cap. (log) -14.46*** -11.39*** -19.07*** -16.26*** -15.08*** -13.15*** -19.57*** -14.03***
(1.372) (3.773) (3.243) (2.725) (1.600) (1.626) (4.130) (1.582)
Recipient pol. instability -0.637 -2.046 -0.415 -0.198 -0.487 -0.490 -0.915 -0.0108
(0.833) (2.627) (0.944) (1.075) (1.069) (0.881) (0.928) (1.090)
Recipient inst. quality 5.226*** 5.171* 6.504*** 5.785** 4.604** 4.854** 4.190** 6.390***
(1.909) (2.892) (1.845) (2.592) (2.279) (1.893) (2.089) (2.203)
Recipient Trade/GDP 0.0572** 0.0645* 0.0514** 0.0568** 0.0804*** 0.0766*** 0.0700*** 0.0559**
(0.0239) (0.0339) (0.0205) (0.0275) (0.0265) (0.0270) (0.0234) (0.0244)
Recipient inflation -0.0625 -0.00562 -0.0464 -0.0399 -0.0725 -0.0618 -0.111* -0.0344
(0.0481) (0.100) (0.0534) (0.0610) (0.0640) (0.0528) (0.0630) (0.0618)
Recipient budget surplus 0.119 0.0468 0.214** 0.202* 0.138 0.132 0.0899 0.161
(0.107) (0.183) (0.0990) (0.111) (0.122) (0.1000) (0.110) (0.111)
Consistency -0.247 1.065 1.929 1.303 0.673 2.022 0.706 1.028
(2.949) (1.685) (1.317) (1.365) (2.388) (3.295) (1.448) (1.395)
∆Consistency 0.410*** 0.477* 0.333** 0.436*** 0.451*** 0.636* 0.609** 0.457***
(0.154) (0.245) (0.133) (0.142) (0.144) (0.337) (0.295) (0.134)
Paid 0.432
(1.654)
∆Paid -0.0248
(0.0651)
Pmigration 6.129
(6.994)
∆Pmigration -0.0459
(0.425)
Pinvestment 2.554
(1.763)
∆Pinvestment -0.143
(0.130)
Ptrade 0.650
(1.094)
∆Ptrade -0.00619
(0.210)
Psecurity 0.342
(0.956)
∆Psecurity 0.0192
(0.0483)
Ptechnology 0.158
(2.564)
∆Ptechnology -0.151
(0.166)
Penvironment 1.117
(1.115)
∆Penvironment -0.102
(0.0955)
Observations 290 299 299 299 290 290 290 299
R-squared 0.881 0.733 0.855 0.809 0.816 0.876 0.862 0.834
Underidentification test
(p value)
0.0603 0.4832 0.0517 0.0784 0.0061 0.0034 0.0828 0.0362
Sargan Statistic (p value) 0.1420 0.7381 0.8672 0.8181 0.7269 0.2162 0.4442 0.7596
Endogeneity test (p value) 0.01111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0148 0.0000 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term, country fixed effects are included but not reported. They are
available upon request. All instruments (distance donor-recipient, common language, donor tax rate, donor debt, donor inflation, donor budget
surplus, donor agriculture share) are weighted by the share of aid flows provided by each donor in total aid received by each developing country.
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Table 7: Alternative instrumentation strategies: effect of changes in donors’ policy coherence on
economic growth
Effect on economic growth: IV, Moving averages, 4 years, Country Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Effect on economic growth
Aid policy Migration
policy
Investment
policy
Trade policy Security pol-
icy
Technology
policy
Environment
policy
Consistency
(only)
Equation (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (4)
Instrumental variables: donors’ interest (common language, geographical distance) and donors’ economic soundness
∆Consistency 0.410*** 0.477* 0.333** 0.436*** 0.451*** 0.636* 0.609** 0.457***
(0.154) (0.245) (0.133) (0.142) (0.144) (0.337) (0.295) (0.134)
Instrumental variables: donors’ interest (colonial legacy, UN voting allegiance)
∆Consistency 0.575** 0.494** 0.257 0.373** 0.436** 0.236 0.441** 0.397**
(0.257) (0.237) (0.227) (0.183) (0.177) (0.289) (0.178) (0.186)
Instrumental variables: all donors’ interest (colonial legacy, UN voting allegiance, common language, geographical distance) and donors’ economic
soundness
∆Consistency 0.456*** 0.222*** 0.256*** 0.251*** 0.328*** 0.246 0.461*** 0.273***
(0.105) (0.0644) (0.0668) (0.0682) (0.0832) (0.163) (0.140) (0.0637)
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term, country fixed effects and all other explanatory variables are
included but not reported. They are available upon request. All instruments (distance donor-recipient, common language, donor tax rate, donor
debt, donor inflation, donor budget surplus, donor agriculture share) are weighted by the share of aid flows provided by each donor in total aid
received by each developing country.
8 Conclusion
Aid effectiveness has been widely addressed in the literature. Political and economic conditions
in recipient countries, under which aid is more effective, have been recognized. Bilateral donors
and international organizations have already begun to allocate more aid towards countries who
have implemented such appropriate policies. More recently, some of donors and researchers have
acknowledged that aid effectiveness should be documented in relation to the donors characteristics
and policies.
The DAC donors have already highlighted that policy coherence is a core concern to achieve the
objective of aid provided by OECD countries. To our knowledge, the quantitative contribution
of policy coherence to economic growth in developing countries has not been documented in the
literature to date.
This paper quantifies the economic impact of aid, which is received from the main 22 OECD
donors by developing countries. The main contribution is threefold: first, we take advantage of the
CGD’s aid indices, and construct a panel dataset allowing to describe the average quality of aid
policies implemented in beneficiary countries over time. Those aid policies cover a wide range of
complementary dimensions of aid: trade, investment, migration, security, environment, technology,
aid.
We do not only investigate the relevance of donors’ domestic policies in shaping bilateral aid. Our
main emphasis is on the key role played by the policy consistency towards poor countries. We
21
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.46
demonstrate that what matters is not the policies themselves, neither in level nor in change, it is
not the consistency itself, but its improvement. In terms of policy recommendation, this implies
that consistency is the most relevant. One isolated aid policy, if implemented alone, can produce
distortions and be harmful for growth in developing countries. Neglecting the interdependence
of domestic policies in donor countries can undermine aid effectiveness. A consistent package of
policies is more likely to produce growth dividends.
Finally, we generalize the result in Berthélémy et al. [2009], who have shown that aid and migration
are not independent from each other: a donor can provide aid and simultaneously tighten his
migration policy. This finding can be generalized to other aid policy dimensions: trade, investment,
policies, and it must be incorporated in the way aid effectiveness is assessed. The effect of aid can
be dampened of enhanced, depending on whether aid is a substitute or a complement for other
policies. In other words, donors should be consistent to be efficient.
Further research should integrate new emerging donors (e.g. China or Brazil ). Understanding
new challenges faced by the donors and the new evidence of aid allocation is key to ensuring aid
effectiveness and supporting economic development. Dreher et al. [2011] highlight that aid from new
donors is less poverty oriented (and does not meet recipient needs). We should investigate the effects
of these new donors on policy consistency towards developing countries and their consequences in
terms of economic development.
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Appendices
A List of countries used in the analysis:
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Benin,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Repub-
lic, China, Colombia, Congo. Dem. Rep., Congo. Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus,
Dominican Republic, Egypt. Arab Rep., El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran. Islamic Rep., Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyr-
gyz Republic, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia. FYR, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,
Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Zambia
B Descriptive Statistics
Recipient Initial GDP per capita in log (average) by region
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sub Saharan Africa 384 6.236678 .0559135 6.142724 6.314064
East Asia and Pacific 248 7.039803 .0777161 6.917009 7.149668
Latin America 208 8.262338 .0567724 8.172635 8.333525
Central America 64 7.828003 .0651843 7.723708 7.898681
Europe and Central Asia 160 7.321912 .1288239 7.099998 7.463863
Middle East and North Africa 144 8.048806 .0679106 7.9312 8.144469
Recipient Inflation rate by region (average)
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sub Saharan Africa 384 10.91748 4.319637 5.746211 18.52082
East Asia and Pacific 248 6.965794 2.657354 3.865644 13.49043
Latin America 208 6.763939 1.898982 4.079096 10.24854
Central America 64 7.159426 2.952595 2.838636 11.95846
Europe and Central Asia 160 7.171097 2.302825 4.234442 12.52323
Middle East and North Africa 144 6.187385 2.147949 4.168356 11.04634
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Recipient Budget Surplus by region (average)
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sub Saharan Africa 384 -.0750813 1.346248 -1.170565 3.382644
East Asia and Pacific 248 -2.571096 .7762969 -3.903062 -1.395189
Latin America 208 -1.697664 1.237116 -3.448204 .1462165
Central America 64 -1.795162 1.010659 -3.671512 -.2866457
Europe and Central Asia 160 -1.328523 1.320198 -3.815784 -.2861046
Middle East and North Africa 144 -.8959775 1.560864 -3.529697 .3391434
Recipient Political Instability by region (average)
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sub Saharan Africa 384 4.035513 .0232904 3.991032 4.055322
East Asia and Pacific 248 3.703297 .0453996 3.61732 3.757068
Latin America 208 3.505575 .0328582 3.454835 3.561624
Central America 64 3.62451 .0311264 3.576217 3.674714
Europe and Central Asia 160 3.806439 .1307932 3.614928 3.973
Middle East and North Africa 144 4.165565 .0623152 4.069672 4.272851
Recipient Institutional Quality by region (average)
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sub Saharan Africa 384 -.6983797 .0151037 -.7298807 -.6776295
East Asia and Pacific 248 -.4981833 .0223778 -.5298268 -.458331
Latin America 208 .0811649 .0425919 .0077944 .1182627
Central America 64 -.225676 .0207368 -.2460509 -.1865626
Europe and Central Asia 160 -.4949382 .051548 -.5811081 -.4274243
Middle East and North Africa 144 -.3816644 .0298006 -.4276959 -.3219688
Recipient Trade Openness by region (average)
Region Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sub Saharan Africa 384 81.85094 3.728418 77.65225 89.00784
East Asia and Pacific 248 91.72275 5.147024 83.34168 97.61929
Latin America 208 74.53417 3.614399 69.02074 80.25102
Central America 64 96.57498 6.695054 84.25074 104.7035
Europe and Central Asia 160 95.62956 4.175244 87.11707 101.6722
Middle East and North Africa 144 87.95484 7.115997 79.58994 98.817
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C Description of explanatory variables
The next tables describe all explanatory variables used in the analysis and their sources.
Table 8: Description of recipient variables and sources
Description of variables
Variables Description Sources
Variables of recipient countries
Initial GDP per capita (in ln) GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by
midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value
of the products. It is calculated without making deduc-
tions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion
and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant
U.S. dollars.
World Development Indicator
(hereafter called WDI) World
Bank
Per capita GDP growth Annual % growth rate of GDP per capita based on GDP
per capita in constant U.S. dollars.
Authors own calculations
Trade (% GDP) Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured
as a share of Gross Domestic Product
WDI, World Bank
Inflation (consumer prices) Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects
the annual percentage change in the cost to the average con-
sumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may
be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly.
The Laspeyres formula is generally used.
WDI, World Bank
Budget Surplus (%GDP) Cash surplus or deficit is revenue (including grants) minus
expense, minus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. In the
1986 GFS manual nonfinancial assets were included under
revenue and expenditure in gross terms. This cash surplus
or deficit is closest to the earlier overall budget balance
(still missing is lending minus repayments, which are now
a financing item under net acquisition of financial assets).
WDI, World Bank
Institutional quality Control of corruption, rule of law, government effective-
ness, Voice and Accountability, regulatory quality (aver-
age). Higher values indicate better governance ratings.
World Governance Indicator
(WGI), World Bank
Political instability It measures perceptions of the likelihood that the govern-
ment will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional
or violent means, including politically-motivated violence
and terrorism. The index is rescaled so that higher values
indicate greater instability. We use the following formula:
Polinst = |PolStab− 3, 5| .
WGI, World Bank
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Table 9: Description of bilateral and donors variables and sources
Description of variables
Variables Description Sources
Bilateral variables
Trade Imports of developed countries OECD bilateral trade
from developing countries. Harmonized system 1988
Migration Stocks of migrants in developed countries from each Global Migrant
developing countries in 2000 Origin Database
(born in developing countries considered)
FDI FDI stocks in 2004 FDI Database CEPII
GTAP 6.2 database for stocks
Distance Lagitudes and Longitudes from the major cities CEPII Gravity Dataset
Common Language Common Official Language CEPII Gravity Dataset
Bilateral aid Current US$ , Millions, Gross Disbursements DAC OECD
Variables of donor countries
Debt donors Total Central Government Debt, % GDP OECD, Statistics
Inflation Consumer prices, % change from previous period OECD, Statistics
Consumer prices, MEI
Budget Surplus (% GDP) Cash surplus or deficit is revenue (including grants) WDI, World Bank
minus expense, minus net acquisition of non financial as-
sets.
UNGA Voting coincidence Country’s voting behavior with respect to the G7 countries
at the UNGA (United Nation General Assembly). All votes
are included (definition according to Thacker)
Dreher and Sturm [2012]
Common colonial past 5 dummies equal to one if the developing countries have
had a colonial link with France, United Kingdom, Belgium,
Spain and Portugal
La Porta et al. [1999]
D Instrumental variables: first stage regressions
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Table 10: Effect of donors’ policies on economic growth in recipient countries, First Stages
IV, Moving averages, 4 years, Country Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Paid ∆Paid Pmigration ∆Pmigration Pinvestment ∆Pinvestment Ptrade ∆Ptrade
Initial GDP per cap (log) -0.429* -22.38** -0.581*** -2.201 1.026*** -2.828*** 1.415*** 14.69***
(0.257) (10.67) (0.160) (1.342) (0.151) (1.050) (0.274) (3.313)
Recipient pol. instability -0.305* -2.672 0.357*** 0.926 0.0850 -0.488 0.327** 1.421
(0.158) (6.550) (0.0904) (0.757) (0.0852) (0.592) (0.154) (1.869)
Recipient inst. quality -0.171 -11.59 0.228 2.771* -0.163 -1.994 0.738** 8.013**
(0.327) (13.58) (0.186) (1.553) (0.175) (1.215) (0.317) (3.835)
Recipient Trade/GDP -0.00546 -0.284** -0.00203 -0.000351 -0.00132 -0.00189 0.000199 0.0670
(0.00344) (0.143) (0.00196) (0.0164) (0.00185) (0.0129) (0.00335) (0.0406)
Recipient inflation 0.00665 -0.148 -0.00623 -0.0800* 0.000125 -0.0246 0.00381 0.0147
(0.00934) (0.388) (0.00532) (0.0445) (0.00501) (0.0348) (0.00908) (0.110)
Recipient budget surplus 0.000112 -0.493 0.0228** 0.0215 0.000954 0.0557 -0.0230 -0.211
(0.0182) (0.757) (0.00959) (0.0802) (0.00903) (0.0628) (0.0164) (0.198)
Distance donor-recipient by aid -0.148*** -6.410*** 0.00451 -0.271 0.0298 -0.473** 0.0225 0.0918
(0.0524) (2.174) (0.0298) (0.249) (0.0280) (0.195) (0.0508) (0.615)
Common language by aid -0.496 -36.18* -0.283 2.108 -0.592** 3.248 -0.712 3.231
(0.518) (21.49) (0.302) (2.525) (0.284) (1.976) (0.515) (6.235)
Donor tax rate by aid 0.0591*** 0.677 0.00368 0.0232 0.00440 0.297*** 0.0102 0.0680
(0.0101) (0.418) (0.00661) (0.0553) (0.00622) (0.0433) (0.0113) (0.137)
Donor debt by aid 0.00230 -0.0486 0.00115 -1.98e-05 -0.000748 0.105*** -0.00423 -0.00967
(0.00268) (0.111) (0.00154) (0.0129) (0.00145) (0.0101) (0.00263) (0.0318)
Donor inflation by aid -0.182*** -3.143 -0.0245 -1.867*** 0.0398 -1.072*** 0.0761 1.478
(0.0673) (2.794) (0.0544) (0.455) (0.0512) (0.356) (0.0929) (1.124)
Donor budget surplus by aid -0.0141 0.205 -0.0363** 0.838*** -0.271*** -1.193***
(0.0168) (0.141) (0.0159) (0.110) (0.0287) (0.348)
Donor agriculture’s share by aid 1.460*** -9.234 -0.00327 3.394*** -0.721*** -3.860*** -0.554*** -7.893***
(0.207) (8.604) (0.123) (1.028) (0.116) (0.804) (0.210) (2.538)
Observations 290 290 299 299 299 299 299 299
R-squared 0.974 0.543 0.975 0.742 0.992 0.879 0.933 0.698
F test of excl. instr. 1.76 1.76 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54
F test p value 0.1086 0.1086 0.1565 0.1565 0.1565 0.1565 0.1565 0.1565
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term, country fixed effects are included but not reported. They are available upon
request. All instruments (distance donor-recipient, common language, donor tax rate, donor debt, donor inflation, donor budget surplus, donor agriculture
share) are weighted by the share of aid flows provided by each donor in total aid received by each developing country.
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Table 11: Effect of donors’ policies on economic growth in recipient countries, First Stages
IV, Moving averages, 4 years, Country Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Psecurity ∆Psecurity Ptechnology ∆Ptechnology Penvironment ∆PenvironmentConsistency ∆Consistency
Initial GDP per cap. (log) 0.148 -18.93 0.212 13.36* 2.265*** -23.59** 0.214** -2.433
(0.244) (11.58) (0.158) (7.565) (0.291) (11.25) (0.103) (4.236)
Recipient pol. instability -0.281** -2.212 -0.0978 0.0699 0.113 -0.945 -0.103* 0.233
(0.137) (6.505) (0.0993) (4.748) (0.164) (6.318) (0.0577) (2.380)
Recipient inst. quality 0.357 29.18** -0.538** -4.819 0.261 -7.758 -0.163 0.321
(0.280) (13.31) (0.207) (9.917) (0.335) (12.93) (0.118) (4.870)
Recipient Trade/GDP -0.00420 -0.376*** -0.00439** -0.0816 -0.00775** -0.261* -0.00167 -0.101*
(0.00296) (0.141) (0.00217) (0.104) (0.00355) (0.137) (0.00125) (0.0516)
Recipient inflation 0.00817 0.471 -0.0130** 0.0347 0.0123 -0.358 0.00244 0.00105
(0.00801) (0.381) (0.00584) (0.279) (0.00958) (0.370) (0.00338) (0.139)
Recipient budget surplus -0.0140 0.109 0.00909 0.256 0.0331* 0.467 0.00370 0.243
(0.0160) (0.760) (0.0115) (0.552) (0.0191) (0.738) (0.00674) (0.278)
Distance donor-recipient by aid 0.0660 -1.179 0.149*** 0.327 -0.0106 0.846 0.0524*** 0.156
(0.0449) (2.132) (0.0330) (1.581) (0.0537) (2.071) (0.0189) (0.780)
Common language by aid 0.118 8.778 -1.032*** -5.319 -1.931*** -29.91 -0.455** -8.376
(0.452) (21.50) (0.328) (15.67) (0.541) (20.89) (0.191) (7.868)
Donor tax rate by aid 0.0756*** -0.633 0.0208*** -0.461 -0.0249** -1.041** 0.0205*** -0.305*
(0.00993) (0.472) (0.00638) (0.305) (0.0119) (0.459) (0.00419) (0.173)
Donor debt by aid -0.00410* -0.161 0.00768*** -0.0735 -0.00610** -0.150 0.00299*** -0.0777*
(0.00231) (0.110) (0.00168) (0.0802) (0.00276) (0.107) (0.000974) (0.0402)
Donor inflation by aid -0.171** 5.418 0.136*** 5.804*** 0.476*** 11.49*** 0.0585* 3.669**
(0.0816) (3.877) (0.0423) (2.022) (0.0976) (3.765) (0.0344) (1.418)
Donor budget surplus by aid -0.153*** -6.172*** -0.195*** -2.147* -0.0128 -0.680
(0.0255) (1.213) (0.0305) (1.178) (0.0108) (0.444)
Donor agriculture’s share by aid 1.375*** -3.366 0.555** -2.156 0.766*** -3.401
(0.184) (8.760) (0.220) (8.508) (0.0777) (3.205)
Observations 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290
R-squared 0.974 0.591 0.976 0.472 0.960 0.394 0.987 0.452
F test of excl. instr. 1.86 1.86 1.64 1.64 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86
F test p value 0.0787 0.0787 0.1517 0.1517 0.0787 0.0787 0.0787 0.0787
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term, country fixed effects are included but not reported. They are available upon
request. All instruments (distance donor-recipient, common language, donor tax rate, donor debt, donor inflation, donor budget surplus, donor agriculture
share) are weighted by the share of aid flows provided by each donor in total aid received by each developing country.
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E IV estimates including country and time fixed effects
Table 12: Effect of donors’ policy on economic growth including time and country fixed effects
IV, Moving averages, 4 years, Country and Time Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Effect on economic growth
Aid policy Migration
policy
Investment
policy
Trade policy Security pol-
icy
Technology
policy
Environment
policy
Consistency
(only)
Equation (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (4)
Initial GDP per cap. (log) -15.96*** -12.02*** -15.90*** -15.09*** -14.45*** -16.11*** -12.68*** -16.29***
(2.203) (4.213) (2.119) (2.735) (2.348) (1.815) (2.720) (1.840)
Recipient pol. instability -0.293 -1.405 -0.359 -0.206 -0.514 -0.641 -0.337 -0.219
(0.880) (1.331) (0.941) (0.969) (1.006) (0.816) (1.061) (0.837)
Recipient inst. quality 4.369** 8.318** 5.742** 7.249** 4.784** 5.019*** 6.449*** 6.017***
(2.017) (3.867) (2.290) (3.231) (2.284) (1.711) (2.277) (1.720)
Recipient Trade/GDP 0.0707*** 0.0542*** 0.0502** 0.0497** 0.0776*** 0.0550*** 0.0559** 0.0448**
(0.0235) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0216) (0.0286) (0.0191) (0.0277) (0.0183)
Recipient inflation -0.0650 -0.0617 -0.0380 -0.0240 -0.0569 -0.0664 -0.0321 -0.0377
(0.0523) (0.0648) (0.0535) (0.0606) (0.0625) (0.0444) (0.0678) (0.0502)
Recipient budget surplus 0.1000 0.143 0.227** 0.221** 0.159 0.208** 0.238* 0.228***
(0.117) (0.111) (0.0917) (0.0972) (0.114) (0.0831) (0.131) (0.0876)
Consistency -0.609 0.534 0.616 0.880 -0.325 -0.0571 2.982 0.636
(2.240) (1.216) (1.118) (1.304) (1.998) (3.769) (1.882) (1.034)
∆Consistency 0.565*** 0.282*** 0.333*** 0.347*** 0.421*** 0.462 0.331 0.315***
(0.200) (0.0942) (0.0879) (0.111) (0.136) (0.328) (0.353) (0.0814)
Paid 2.160
(1.632)
∆Paid -0.0937
(0.0751)
Pmigration 6.129
(6.994)
∆Pmigration -1.039
(1.074)
Ptrade 1.010
(1.153)
∆Ptrade -0.0370
(0.204)
Pinvestment 1.631
(5.168)
∆Pinvestment 0.442
(0.675)
Psecurity 0.650
(0.840)
∆Psecurity 0.0101
(0.0505)
Ptechnology 1.383
(2.832)
∆Ptechnology -0.139
(0.205)
Penvironment -2.433*
(1.248)
∆Penvironment 0.0712
(0.117)
Observations 290 299 299 299 290 290 290 299
R-squared 0.871 0.854 0.864 0.855 0.841 0.918 0.817 0.876
Underidentification test (p
value)
0.0198 0.6078 0.0531 0.0739 0.0193 0.0587 0.0312 0.0012
Sargan Statistic (p value) 0.7511 0.9697 0.5998 0.5660 0.4129 0.3735 0.9788 0.7164
Endogeneity test (p value) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0624 0.0000 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term, country fixed effects are included but not reported. They are
available upon request. All instruments (distance donor-recipient, common language, donor tax rate, donor debt, donor inflation, donor budget
surplus, donor agriculture share) are weighted by the share of aid flows provided by each donor in total aid received by each developing country.
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Table 13: Effect of donors’ policy on economic growth with clustered standard errors
IV, Moving averages, 4 years, Country Fixed Effect, Clustered by country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Effect on economic growth
Aid policy Migration
policy
Investment
policy
Trade policy Security pol-
icy
Technology
policy
Environment
policy
Consistency
(only)
Equation (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (3b) (4)
Consistency -0.247 1.065 1.929 1.303 0.673 2.022 0.706 1.028
(4.804) (3.953) (2.804) (3.176) (5.006) (4.298) (2.693) (3.340)
∆Consistency 0.410** 0.477* 0.333** 0.436*** 0.451** 0.636* 0.609 0.457***
(0.175) (0.283) (0.150) (0.153) (0.180) (0.345) (0.421) (0.155)
Paid 0.432
(2.159)
∆Paid -0.0248
(0.0673)
Pmigration 6.129
(7.711)
∆Pmigration -0.0459
(0.495)
Pinvestment 2.554
(2.028)
∆Pinvestment -0.143
(0.169)
Ptrade 0.650
(1.245)
∆Ptrade -0.00619
(0.222)
Psecurity 0.342
(1.310)
∆Psecurity 0.0192
(0.0678)
Ptechnology 0.158
(3.176)
∆Ptechnology -0.151
(0.153)
Penvironment 1.117
(1.622)
∆Penvironment -0.102
(0.151)
Observations 290 299 299 299 290 290 290 299
Robust Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on country. Constant
term, country fixed effects are included but not reported. All exogenous variables are partialled-out. All instruments (distance donor-recipient, common
language, donor tax rate, donor debt, donor inflation, donor budget surplus, donor agriculture share) are weighted by the share of aid flows provided
by each donor in total aid received by each developing country.
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